Jean-Marie Meier

with Alexander Donges and Rui C. Silva, Forthcoming, Management Science, link to Online Appendix, replication files, SSRN Version, MS Version
SSRN version is identical to MS version except for formatting and copy editing.

Inclusive institutions are a first-order determinant of innovation.

Media: VoxEU

Grants and stipends:
-Deloitte Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant
-Deloitte Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship stipend

Abstract: We study the impact of inclusive institutions on innovation using novel, hand-collected, county-level data for Imperial Germany. We use the timing and geography of the French occupation of different German regions after the French Revolution of 1789 as an instrument for institutional quality. We find that the number of patents per capita in counties with the longest occupation was more than double that in unoccupied counties. Among the institutional changes brought by the French, the introduction of the Code civil, ensuring equality before the law, and the promotion of commercial freedom through the abolition of guilds and trade licenses had a stronger effect on innovation than the abolition of serfdom, which increased labor market mobility, and agricultural reforms that broke up the power of rural elites. The effect of institutions on innovation is particularly pronounced for high-tech innovation, suggesting that innovation might be a key channel through which institutions ultimately affect economic growth. Our findings highlight inclusive institutions as a first order determinant of innovation.

March 15, 2020May 20, 2022

“The Bright Side of Fire Sales”

with Henri Servaes, 2019, Review of Financial Studies, 32(11), 4228–4270, SSRN Version, RFS Version
SSRN version is identical to RFS version except for formatting and copy editing.

Fire sales are not as bad as widely thought since buyers gain substantially from them and the externalities of fire sales for other stakeholders are limited.

Media: Academic Times, LBS Press Release, CLS Blue Sky Blog, Management Today, New York Times DealBook, VoxEU

Abstract: Firms that buy assets in fire sales earn excess returns that are two percentage points higher than in regular acquisitions. The mechanism behind this result is the reduced bargaining power of the seller. We find no difference in real effects or in the combined returns for buyers and sellers between fire sales and regular acquisitions, suggesting that the quality of the match is similar in both types of transactions. The externalities of fire sales for other stakeholders are limited. These results indicate that the welfare losses associated with fire sales are smaller than previously thought.

January 15, 2020May 20, 2022

“The Benefits of Buying Distressed Assets”

with Henri Servaes, 2020, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 32(4), 105-116.

Non-technical summary of RFS article “The Bright Side of Fire Sales”.

Media: Academic Times, Management Today

April 2, 2018July 10, 2020

Working Papers

March 5, 2018December 26, 2022

“Cross-Border Institutions and the Globalization of Innovation”

with Bo Bian and Ting Xu, Reject & Resubmit, Management Science

Strong cross-border institutions are an important driver of the globalization of innovation.

Conferences*: 25th Taiwan Symposium on Innovation Economics and Entrepreneurship, 3rd Junior Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Workshop, AEA, Cavalcade, China International Conference in Finance, EEA, EFA, FIRS, MFA, NFA, Pacific Northwest Finance Conference, Thirteenth Annual Northwestern/USPTO Conference on Innovation Economics.

Media: Darden Ideas to Action

Abstract: We identify strong cross-border institutions as a driver for the globalization of innovation. Using 67 million patents from over 100 patent offices, we introduce novel measures of innovation diffusion and collaboration. Exploiting staggered bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as shocks to cross-border property rights and contract enforcement, we show that signatory countries increase technology adoption and sourcing from each other; they also increase R&D collaborations. Consistent with BITs reducing investment frictions, the results are particularly strong for process innovation and for countries with weak domestic institutions. Foreign investments with high frictions, such as inter-firm investments in R&D-active sectors, are most responsive to BITs.

March 2, 2018March 26, 2023

“Did Western CEO Incentives Contribute to China’s Technological Rise?”

with Bo Bian.

CEOs of Western firms with high-powered incentive contracts transfer more of their firms’ technologies to China than other CEOs, thereby contributing to China’s technological rise, while harming their firms in the long-run.

Conferences*: 6th Erasmus Corporate Governance Conference, FMA Napa/Sonoma Conference, AFA, Annual Meeting of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, Cavalcade Asia-Pacific, China International Conference in Finance, Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting, Finance, Organizations and Markets (FOM) Conference, GSU CEAR-Finance Conference on Technology, Innovation, and Corporate Finance, Junior Entrepreneurial Finance/Innovation Lunch Group, Lone Star Symposium, MFA, Munich Summer Institute, NBER Chinese Economy, Northeastern University Finance Conference, Paris December Finance Meeting, RCFS Winter Conference, Workshop on Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation

Recordings of Presentations: Workshop on Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation

Abstract: We study the role of Western CEO incentives in fostering the technological rise of China. Due to China’s quid pro quo policy, foreign multinationals face a trade-off between the short-term benefits of accessing China’s vast market and the long-term costs of transferring technology to China. Leveraging microdata on the global patent network, we construct multiple measures to describe technological interactions between US firms and over 70 countries. We find that firms managed by CEOs with high-powered incentive contracts form more partnerships with China and transfer more technology to China. These firms subsequently lose R&D human capital to China and face more patenting competition from China, suggesting negative long-term consequences in innovation. We provide evidence consistent with the myopia-inducing instead of the effort-inducing property of high-powered CEO incentives. The paper reveals an important real effect of CEO incentives and highlights a novel channel behind China’s technological catch-up. Our findings have wide policy implications, informing both the future design of CEO compensation packages and the regulatory architecture concerning technological interactions with China.

February 16, 2018March 18, 2023

“Tax Avoidance through Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions”

with Jake Smith.

Tax avoidance is a significant determinant of cross-border M&A.

Conferences*: 7th IWH-FIN-FIRE Workshop on “Challenges to Financial Stability”, AEA, Annual Meeting of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, Cavalcade, China International Conference in Finance, EEA, EIASM Conference on Current Research in Taxation, Finance, Organizations and Markets (FOM) Conference, National Tax Association, Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting Conference, MFA, Paris December Finance Meeting, Seventh Annual M&A Research Centre Conference, ZEW Public Finance conference

Abstract: We investigate 13,307 cross-border, tax-haven mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from 1990 to 2017, totaling $4.1 trillion in deal value, or about 30% of total cross-border M&A volume. $2.4 of the $4.1 trillion is beyond what is predicted based on a gravity model with economic fundamentals. Tax-haven M&A result in $30.7 billion in recurring annual tax avoidance. To illustrate the magnitude, for a US firm with no prior cross-border, tax-haven M&A history, buying an Irish firm worth 5% of its total assets would result in an expected decline in its effective tax rate of 3.32 percentage points. For identification, we use a change in US tax law in 2004. Following haven acquisitions, firms are more likely to relocate their headquarters to havens. Our results document that tax avoidance through havens is a significant determinant of cross-border M&A.

January 16, 2018February 9, 2023

“Improving the Measurement of Tax Residence: Implications for Research on Corporate Taxation”

with Jake Smith.

We develop a tax residence algorithm and provide quantitative evidence on its importance in many frequently examined settings in international corporate taxation.

Grants: International Tax Policy Forum

Conferences*: Cavalcade, EIASM Conference on Current Research in Taxation, Finance, Organizations and Markets (FOM) Conference, Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Conference

Abstract: We highlight an opportunity for improved measurement of a key data item in corporate tax research; a firm’s tax residence or “tax citizenship.” Some countries define tax residence based on a firm’s location of incorporation, some on a firm’s location of headquarters, and some consider both locations. Because no data source exists that provides information on firms’ tax residence, studies typically apply a uniform assignment of either the location of incorporation, headquarters, or center of business activity. We use a novel algorithm that embeds the residency laws of 150 countries to accurately assign tax residence. We reassign the tax residence of a considerable fraction of firms relative to standard proxies, and provide evidence that reassignment significantly affects inferences. For instance, for cross-border mergers and acquisitions with a US acquiror, 16% of the deal value involves an acquiror that is reassigned. Moreover, reassigned firms are systematically different from other firms along several dimensions, including effective tax rates.

January 16, 2018May 17, 2022

“Regulatory Integration of International Capital Markets”

Regulatory integration of international capital markets causes large increases in external financing, investment and employment.

Awards:
-Klaus Liebscher Award by the Austrian Central Bank
-Josseph de la Vega Prize (Special Mention) by the Federation of European Securities Exchanges
-European Central Bank’s Young Economist Award (Finalist)
-AQR Fellowship Award (Finalist)

Conferences*: Conference on “Banks, Systemic Risk, Measurement and Mitigation” (co-organised by RFS), Global Issues in Accounting Conference (organised by Chicago Booth), AEA, AFA, Barcelona GSE Summer Forum (Financial Intermediation and Risk workshop), Chicago Financial Institutions Conference, China International Conference in Finance, Christmas Meeting of German Economists Abroad, Conference on Capital Markets Union, European Winter Finance Summit, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Banking and Finance Workshop, MFA, NFA, North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 6th Financial Market Symposium, Public Authority and Finance: What is the Relevant Scale and Scope of Deregulation and Re-Regulation?.

Abstract: I examine the financial and real effects of regulatory integration of international capital markets using a unique policy plan by the European Union, which creates a common European market for financial services and capital, through, e.g., passporting rights. For identification, I exploit the bilateral and staggered nature of laws that are passed at the European level but are implemented by national governments. Over its implementation, regulatory integration leads to large increases in external financing, investment and employment for publicly listed firms. These results highlight the importance of regulatory integration of international capital markets for firms’ financing decisions and real outcomes.

February 15, 2016September 10, 2021

“The COVID-19 Bailouts”

Published as a pre-print in Covid Economics, Issue 83, 2 July 2021

with Jake Smith.

The COVID-19 bailouts are a windfall for many firms, and are expensive compared to past corporate income tax payments of the bailout firms.

First version: April 25, 2020

Conferences*: AEA

Abstract: We use hand-collected data to investigate the COVID-19 bailouts for all publicly listed US firms. The median tax rate is 4% for bailout firms and 16% for no-bailout firms. The bailouts are expensive when compared to past corporate income tax payments of the bailout firms. We compute the number of years a bailout recipient has to pay corporate income tax to generate as much tax revenue as it received in bailouts: 135.0 years for the Paycheck Protection Program and 267.9 years for the airline bailouts. We also document a dark side of the bailouts. For many firms, the bailouts appear to be a windfall. Numerous bailout recipients made risky financial decisions, so bailing them out might induce moral hazard. Moreover, lobbying expenditures positively predict the bailout likelihood and amount.

June 3, 1990May 17, 2022

* including scheduled conferences

How to pronounce my first name – link

Posts

Publications

“The Impact of Institutions on Innovation”

“The Bright Side of Fire Sales”

“The Benefits of Buying Distressed Assets”

Working Papers

“Cross-Border Institutions and the Globalization of Innovation”

“Did Western CEO Incentives Contribute to China’s Technological Rise?”

“Tax Avoidance through Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions”

“Improving the Measurement of Tax Residence: Implications for Research on Corporate Taxation”

“Regulatory Integration of International Capital Markets”

“The COVID-19 Bailouts”